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So explains John Lott, in
an opinion column for Foxnews.com. Not a surprising
result. The McDonald v. Chicago
amicus brief I
wrote for the International Law Enforcements Educators &
Trainers Association (and other law enforcement organizations,
and criminologists) showed that after Chicago enacted its
handgun ban, its violent crime rate rose sharply. Pre-ban,
Chicago had a violent crime rate 1.12 times greater than the
violent crime rate of the 24 other largest cities. (That is,
Chicago’s violent crime rate was 12% higher than that of the
24 other cities.) Post-ban, Chicago’s crime rate soared
immediately, and remained 67% higher than the other large
cities. The possibility that Chicago’s sudden and
long-standing deterioration compared to other large cities is
less than 1 in 100,000. Details are presented at pages 17–22
of the brief, and the appendices.
That’s the
question posed today over at Scotusblog. It’s the
premiere of the
Scotusblog Community, which aims to encourage
discussions by Scotusblog readers. To start the ball
rolling, Scotusblog solicited short comments (up to 2
paragraphs) from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dawn Johnsen, Ilya
Shapiro, Stephen Presser, Adam Winkler, and me, among
others.
My answer to what the Supreme Court should do
is:
The Court should re-affirm Gibbons v. Ogden, which
followed the original understanding of the interstate
commerce clause: “commerce” means mercantile exchange,
plus some closely-related subjects, such as
navigation. Among the subjects which are not
interstate commerce, according to Gibbons, are “health
laws of every description.” The Court should then
over-rule South-Eastern Underwriters (1944), which
broke from long-established precedent, and declared
that even purely intrastate insurance was interstate
commerce. Because South-Eastern claimed to be
following original meaning, the modern Court should
simply point out that none of the original sources
cited by the South-Eastern opinion remotely support
the contention that all forms of insurance are
“commerce.”
Finally, Congress should explain
that the Necessary and Proper clause underscores the
unconstitutionality of the mandate. As McCulloch v.
Maryland demonstrated, the original meaning of the
clause affirms the Congress may exercise powers which
are incidental to an enumerated power. The power to
compel a private person to engage in commerce with a
private company is not an incident of, or lesser than,
the power to regulate voluntary interstate commerce.
Further, government-created monopolies were, in the
Founding Era, a paradigmatic example of improper
government action. Therefore, it is not
constitutionally “proper” to force citizens to spend
their money on a government-favored Big Insurance
oligopoly.
The rationale for the above can be found in my articles
Bad News
for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121
Yale Law Journal Online (forthcoming 2011)(with Gary
Lawson); “Health
Laws of Every Description”: John Marshall’s Ruling on
a Federal Health Care Law, 12 Engage 49 (June 2011)
(with Robert G. Natelson);
Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack
Balkin, 109 Michigan Law Review First Impressions 55
(2010) (with Natelson); and Health insurance is not
‘commerce’: A single erroneous Supreme Court precedent
from 1944, South-Eastern Underwriters, should be
overturned, National Law Journal, March 28, 2011
(with Natelson) (available on Lexix/Nexis).
Since Scotusblog is trying to get people to comment on
its own website, I’m not opening comments on this post,
and I encourage you to share you thoughts over at
Scotusblug.
Currently before the Illinois Supreme Court is People
v. Aguilar, which raises the question of whether Illinois
can, consistently with the Second Amendment, prohibit the
carrying of firearms for lawful self-defense in public places.
Illinois is the only state with such a blanket prohibition.
Illinois state law bans open and concealed carry, and has no
procedure for licensing either. The only people allowed to
exercise the right to defensive carry are persons in some
specially-favored categories, such as elected officials and
security guards.
Oklahoma City Univ. law professor Michael O’Shea has
written an
amicus brief in the case, on behalf of co-authors of the
forthcoming law school textbook
Firearms Law and
the Second Amendment (Aspen, 2012). O’shea’s
co-authors Nicholas Johnson (Fordham) and I both made some
suggestions for the brief, but the vast majority of the work
was done by O’Shea. As the brief demonstrates, McDonald
and Heller make it clear that the Second
Amendment protects a right to carry arms (except in “sensitive
places”). The brief does not argue in favor of a particular
system for licensed or unlicensed carry. Rather, our point is
that a complete prohibition is facially unconstitutional;
there is no need to get into the standard of review issues
that would be involved in a regulation (as opposed to a
complete prohibition) of the exercise of the right to bear
arms.
Very early next year–in time for 2d semester classes in the
2011-12 academic year–Aspen Publishers will publish the first
law school textbook on the the Second Amendment. The title is
Firearms Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights,
and Policy. The co-authors are Nicholas Johnson
(Fordham), Michael O’Shea (Oklahoma City), George Mocsary
(Connecticut), and me.
Below the fold is the full Table of Contents and Preface
for the book. (Pasting the Word document into the blog format
significantly altered many of the indents, line spacing, and
outline numbering for chapter subdivisions, so the TOC below
does not look exactly like the TOC of the book itself.)
Because the textbook is currently in the production process,
review copies are not yet available. Indeed, the Aspen
website’s promotional page for the book is still several weeks
away. However, if you might use the textbook next semester,
and would like to see some chapters, just contact any of the
co-authors, and we can mail them to you.
The 11 chapters of the printed textbook proceed
chronologically, from ancient Rome, Greece, and China, all the
way to the post–Heller cases. Four additional,
on-line only chapters cover some special topics. Those
electronic chapters will be available to all students and
professors using the textbook.
Besides being sold as a conventional hardback, Firearms
Law will also be available in individual electronic
chapters. So if you are teaching a constitutional law course
and would like to include a 2 or 3 week unit on the Second
Amendment, your students could buy chapter 9 (Heller
and McDonald) plus chapter 11 (post–Heller
cases in the lower courts). Or if you’re teaching an advanced
criminal law class, you might want to have your students buy
chapter 8, which covers the modern criminal law of gun
control, particularly under the federal Gun Control Act.
Continue reading ‘New law school textbook on the Second
Amendment and firearms regulation’ »
On Tuesday I testified before the U.S. House subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, regarding H.R.
822, which would set up a national system of interstate
reciprocity for concealed handgun carry permits. My 24-page
written testimony is
here.
The
video of the subcommittee hearing is about and hour and 45
minutes. Nearly all members of the 21-member attended the
hearing, and used their opportunity to ask 5 minutes worth of
questions. Most of the questions posed to George Mason Law’s
Prof. Joyce Malcolm, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles
Ramsey, and me, were quite thoughtful. Some congressional
hearings are just a form of kabuki theater, but in Tuesday’s
hearing, Representatives of both parties, and on both sides of
the gun issue, seemed to be sincerely trying to learn more.
The bill currently has 243 House co-sponsors.
Rob Natelson
explains it all in his latest blog post. Short answer: if
the purpose of the tax is raising revenue (e.g., the Stamp
Act), it’s a tax. If the purpose is the regulation of commerce
(e.g., a prohibitive tariff on imported French clothing; a
shipping tax dedicated to paying for harbor improvements),
then it’s not a “tax” in the the constitutional sense. Rather,
it is a regulation of commerce.
The American colonists believed that Parliament had full
authority to regulate external commerce, such as by imposing
protectionist tariffs. The colonists also believed that
Parliament had no authority to impose domestic taxes in the
colonies (such as the Stamp Act). The colonists had a very
firm sense of the distinction, and ended up going to war over
Parliament’s refusal to respect that distinction. Because the
Obamacare mandate is designed purely to control behavior, and
not to raise revenue (even if it, like a protectionist tariff
on French clothing does ultimately raise a little revenue),
the Obamacare mandate is a type of commerce regulation, and
not a tax in the constitutional sense. That, at least, is what
the original meaning tells us.
Of course whether the individual mandate actually qualifies
as a regulation of “commerce...among the several States” is a
separate issue. The original meaning question for the
mandate’s penalty is a commerce issue, not a tax issue.
That’s the question raised by a lawsuit in Colorado’s
federal district court, in the case of Kerr v.
Hickenlooper. In an
amicus brief, I suggest that the answer is “no.” The brief
relies heavily on the scholarship of my Independence Institute
colleague Rob Natelson, who happens to be the leading
scholarly expert on the Guarantee clause.
In short, the Founders defined a “republic” to include
governments such as those of ancient Athens, Carthage, and
Sparta, all of which included elements of direct democracy.
According to Minor v. Happersett (U.S. 1875), the
decision of Congress to admit a state to the Union is
conclusive proof that, at the time, the state had a Republican
Form of Government. Massachusetts and Rhode Island had
referenda when they were admitted. The progressive movement
for initiative and referendum began in the last 19th century.
Congress chose to admit Oklahoma (1907) which had very strong
I&R provisions in its state constitution, and New Mexico
(1911), whose statehood constitution specifically provided for
the creation of a citizen initiative system.
Courts have held that the Republican Form of Government
issue is not justiciable, and enforcement is up to Congress.
The amicus brief, however, addresses the merits of the issue.
Today South Carolina Republican Senator Jim Demint hosted a
forum at which five Republican presidential candidates spoke.
The transcript is here. Each candidate appeared one at a
time, and the format allowed for in-depth questions and
answers. Among the questioners was Princeton University’s
Robert George. Prof. George asked each candidate if he or she
would support congressional legislation, under section 5 of
the 14th Amendment, to ban abortion. To state the obvious,
such legislation would be contrary not only to Roe v. Wade
and Penn. v. Casey (abortion rights are protected by
section 1 of the 14th Amendment), but also to Boerne v.
Flores (Congress cannot use section 5 to protect a right
in defiance of direct Supreme Court holding about the
particular aspect of the right). The question explicitly
presumed that Roe v. Wade had not been overturned,
and that a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution had not
been adopted.
The candidates’ answers were as follows:
Bachmann: Yes.
Cain: Yes.
Gingrich: Yes. Cooper v. Aaron’s assertion of
judicial supremacy was wrong. Following the precedent of
the first Jefferson administration, I would abolish some
federal judgeships. But I am not as bold as Jefferson. “I
would do no more than eliminate Judge Barry in San Antonio
and the ninth circuit. That’s the most I would go for.
(LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE). But let me say this. That’s part of
the national debate. That’s not a rhetorical comment. I
believe the legislative and executive branches have an
obligation to defend the constitution against judges who
are tyrannical and who seek to impose un-American values
on the people of the United States.”
Paul: No. Violence and murder should be dealt with by
the states. The federal police are already too numerous. I
support a bill to deprive lower federal courts of
jurisdiction over abortion cases, so that state
restrictions on abortion would be immune from judicial
review.
Romney: No. I would focus on appointing judges who
would return abortion regulation to the states. The George
proposal “would create obviously a constitutional crisis.
Could that happen in this country? Could there be
circumstances where that might occur? I think it’s
reasonable that something of that nature might happen
someday. That’s not something I would precipitate.”
Personally, I agree with the Romney approach. Moreover, the
next President is going to have to address a fiscal crisis
that will devastate the United States economy soon if it is
not solved. Dealing with the fiscal crisis is going to be
quite difficult politically, in part because there are many
millions of people who benefit from the current, and
unsustainable, levels of federal spending. The tax consumers
may be very highly resistant to any reduction in the amount of
money that flows to them. So there will be no shortage of
national division and acrimony. Thus, 2013 would be an
especially bad time to precipitate a constitutional crisis
over a social issue. The answers of Romney and Paul displayed
prudence, which I think is a very important characteristic for
a President, and the answers of Bachmann, Cain, and Gingrich
did not.
As for the Ninth Circuit, Gingrich has
been saying the same thing since March, according to
Politico. I have not found anywhere where he has provided
details on this plan, but perhaps it would involve merging the
9th circuit states into the 8th and 10th circuits, since they
border the 9th. The Politico article is not entirely clear,
but it appears that Gingrich has claimed that he could get rid
of the 9th circuit by signing an executive order. This would
be plainly unconstitutional, a usurpation of power worthy of
impeachment. Article III gives Congress, not the President,
the power to “ordain and establish” the inferior federal
courts. During the Jefferson administration, the Judiciary Act
of 1802 repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, in which the lame
duck Federalist Congress had created many new federal
judgeships, to which President John Adams had appointed
Federalists in the waning days of his administration. As
President Jefferson recognized, the choice to eliminate
federal judgeships belongs to Congress, not the President
acting by himself. [Update: a commenter says the video (for
which a link was not provided) shows that Gingrich was not
claiming that he could abolish the 9th Cir. by executive
order. I looked on the Internet, and did not find a video of
the March 25 Iowa speech by Gingrich. There’s a video of a
speech earlier that month in Iowa, in which he criticizes the
9th cir. but does not call for its abolition.]
My
recent article for America’s 1st Freedom traces
the rise and fall of the theory that the Second Amendment is
not an individual right, but instead is a “collective right,”
which, like “collective property” in a communist country,
supposedly belongs to everyone collectively, but in fact
belongs to no-one. The theory was created by a federal
district judge in 1935, formally named by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1968, and became popular among lower federal
courts during the next quarter-century.
Historical and textual analysis made it increasingly clear
that the theory was completely implausible, and it was
unanimously rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2008
case District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case,
all nine justices agreed that the Second Amendment right was
individual, while they disagreed about its scope.
Tags:
Collective right,
Second
Amendment
This
essay, which I wrote in 2000, celebrates the brave men and
women of the Colorado labor movement, who in the coal fields
of southern Colorado early in the 20th century, stood up
against murderous company goons and against the soldiers of
the Colorado National Guard who perverted their organization.
Labor Day is a day to remember that labor rights are human
rights, and that the right of Americans to come together in
voluntary organizations, including labor unions, is part of
the core of American freedom. On Veterans Day or Memorial Day,
we remember that the freedoms we enjoy today are the fruit of
the sacrifices made by our armed forces. We remember this even
if we disagree with some military actions, or even if we know
that some past or present military leaders were bad people.
Likewise, on Labor Day, even if we recognize the harmfulness
of much of the current agenda of SEIU, NEA, and so on, we
should remember the historic debt that all Americans owe to
the Labor movement. One part of that debt is the essential
role that labor leaders such as Walter Reuther and Lane
Kirkland played in providing bipartisan support for resistance
to the evil Soviet empire, an empire whose ultimate objective
was to reduce all the workers of the world to slavery.
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